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Abstract
Information provision experiments allow researchers to test economic theories and answer
policy-relevant questions by varying the information set available to respondents. We
survey the emerging literature using information provision experiments in economics and
discuss applications in macroeconomics, finance, political economy, public economics,
labor economics, and health economics. We also discuss design considerations and
provide best-practice recommendations on how to (i) measure beliefs, (ii) design the
information intervention, (iii) measure belief updating, (iv) deal with potential confounds,
such as experimenter demand effects, and (v) recruit respondents using online panels. We
finally discuss typical effect sizes and provide sample size recommendations.
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1 Motivation
Standard economic theories usually understand choices as a combination of three factors:
preferences, constraints, and beliefs. Information enters the choice environment indirectly
by affecting beliefs and (perceived) constraints. For instance, in the context of a firm
owner choosing how much to invest, information about historical returns could affect
beliefs about the return on investment while information about loan opportunities could
affect borrowing constraints. The goal of economic experiments is typically to change
some features of the choice environment to study how choices are made. Information
experiments achieve this by varying the information set available to economic agents.
Information provision experiments allow researchers to provide cleanly identified evi-
dence by only varying one feature of the information set. This in turn provides researchers
with tools to test either basic assumptions of models or differentiate between different
theoretical mechanisms. For example, Bursztyn et al. (2014) use information treatments
to study the relative importance of “social learning” and “social utility” in the context
of peer effects in financial decisions, while Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) use information
treatments to identify the importance of different behavioral biases in the lightbulb market.
One powerful possibility opened up by information experiments is to generate ex-
ogenous variation in perceptions of real-world environments, which allows answering
policy-relevant questions. Information provision experiments allow changing perceptions
of real-world phenomena which themselves cannot be directly changed. For instance,
in labor economics, an important policy question is to what extent students internalize
market returns to education when making educational choices. While researchers cannot
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manipulate the returns to education, they can provide information to generate exogenous
variation in the perceived returns to education (Jensen, 2010). When studying attitudes
towards immigration, it is impossible to change the characteristics of immigrants, but
researchers can vary perceptions of the immigrant population by correcting people’s
misperceptions (Grigorieff et al., 2020). Similarly, researchers cannot manipulate intergen-
erational mobility or influence the state of the macroeconomy, but it is possible to change
perceptions of intergenerational mobility (Alesina et al., 2018c) or the perceived likelihood
of a recession (Roth and Wohlfart, 2020). Finally, researchers cannot manipulate social
norms, but information provision experiments can be used to study the causal effect of
perceived social norms on behavior (Bursztyn et al., 2020b).
The opportunities provided by information experiments to test economic theories and
answer policy-relevant questions have made them popular in economics over the last few
years. As shown in Figure 1, the number of information provision experiments published
in leading economics journals has strongly increased over the last ten years. This growth
demonstrates the increasing importance of information provision in experimental work. In
this article, we review the growing literature on information experiments in economics with
a particular focus on methodological questions. Many of the methodological questions
discussed in this review also extend beyond information provision experiments, and have
relevance for the design of other types of experiments or for collecting non-experimental
survey data.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 summarizes areas in which information ex-
periments have been widely applied. Section 3 outlines best-practice recommendations for
the measurement of beliefs. Section 4 discusses the design of the information intervention.
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Section 5 outlines important aspects of the measurement of belief updating. Section 6
discusses best-practice recommendations for mitigating concerns about experimenter de-
mand effects. Section 7 discusses online samples that are commonly used for information
provision experiments. Section 8 discusses typical effect sizes and provides sample size
recommendations. Finally, Section 9 offers concluding remarks.
2 Major applications
In this section, we provide an overview of areas in economics in which information
provision experiments have been widely applied. This review is necessarily incomplete,
and focuses on applications in public economics, political economy, macroeconomics,
household finance, and labor, education and health economics.1
Public Economics Information provision experiments are used in many areas of public
economics. Chetty and Saez (2013) conduct an experiment with 43,000 Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) recipients, in which a random subset received personalized information
about the EITC schedule. Chen et al. (2010) find that personalized social information can
significantly increase digital public goods provision, in the form of user moving ratings
and community database maintenance. Chen et al. (2017) conduct a field experiment
with 75,000 drivers, establishing that social information can reduce traffic violations.
Doerrenberg and Peichl (2018) examine how social norms affect tax morale, and Blesse et
1Our review does not include information provision experiments operating in a laboratory setting in
which respondents receive information about features of the laboratory environment or the behavior of other
participants in the lab. The review also does not feature work studying the role of the media in shaping
beliefs and behavior.
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al. (2019) study how beliefs shape preferences for tax simplification.
Bérgolo et al. (2017) and Doerrenberg and Schmitz (2015) examine how firms respond
to information about audit probabilities, and Bott et al. (2020) study whether people’s
tendency to evade taxes responds to information about detection probability and moral
appeals. Similarly, Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2018) examine how information on finan-
cial penalties, shaming penalties, and peer comparisons shape tax delinquents’ future
repayment rates. De Neve et al. (2021) study the impact of deterrence, tax morale, and sim-
plifying information on tax compliance. Jessoe and Rapson (2014) show that information
about residential electricity usage makes households more responsive to temporary price
increases. Finally, a literature in behavioral public economics has studied how mispercep-
tions regarding the fuel economy affect consumers’ purchasing decisions (Allcott, 2013;
Allcott and Knittel, 2019; Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015).
Political Economy Information experiments are also commonly used to study how
information affects policy attitudes, such as people’s demand for redistribution (Alesina
et al., 2018c; Chen et al., 2016; Cruces et al., 2013; Fehr et al., 2021, 2019; Gärtner et al.,
2019; Hoy and Mager, 2018; Karadja et al., 2017; Kuziemko et al., 2015), their support
for government spending (Lergetporer et al., 2018a; Roth et al., 2021a), their views on
educational inequality (Lergetporer et al., 2020) and tuition fees (Lergetporer et al., 2016),
their support for immigration (Alesina et al., 2018a; Bansak et al., 2016; Barrera et al., 2020;
Facchini et al., 2016; Grigorieff et al., 2020; Haaland and Roth, 2020; Hopkins et al., 2019;
Lergetporer et al., 2017), their tendency to discriminate against immigrants (Alesina et
al., 2018b), their support for affirmative action (Haaland and Roth, 2021; Settele, 2020),
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or affective party polarization (Ahler and Sood, 2018). In the context of the coronavirus
pandemic, Settele and Shupe (2020) study the role of beliefs for supporting lockdown
measures and Rafkin et al. (2021) study determinants of inference from official government
projections.
Information experiments are also conducted to better understand the demand for
news and the implications of media exposure for behavior. Chopra et al. (2021) study
how perceived informativeness affects people’s demand for economic and political news.
Bursztyn et al. (2020e) study how the common knowledge of rationales (which are usually
supplied by the media) affects the public expression of xenophobia through the lens of a
signaling model.
In the context of natural field experiments, researchers have used information treat-
ments to study voting behavior (Aker et al., 2017; Cruz et al., 2021, 2018; Gerber et al., 2020;
Kendall et al., 2015; Orkin, 2019) or to study strategic behavior of political activists (Hager
et al., 2020, 2021) and protesters (Cantoni et al., 2019; Hager et al., 2019).
Experiments studying the effects of information campaigns in the context of political
behavior have also been widely applied in developing country settings. Armand et al.
(2020) test whether information can counteract the political resource curse in Mozambique.
Acemoglu et al. (2020) study whether information about improved public services can
help build trust in state institutions and move people away from non-state actors in
Pakistan. Khan et al. (2020) document that information about past state effectiveness has a
limited impact on support for policy, perceptions of state capacity, and trust in the state in
Pakistan. Finally, Banerjee et al. (2018) show that mailing cards with program information
to targeted beneficiaries reduces “leakage” in redistribution programs due to local officials
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not implementing government programs.
Macroeconomics Information provision experiments have been widely used in macroe-
conomics to study how households and firms form expectations about inflation (Armantier
et al., 2016; Binder and Rodrigue, 2018; Cavallo et al., 2017; Coibion et al., 2021b, 2018,
2020d,e), house prices (Armona et al., 2019; Fuster et al., 2020), interest rates (Coibion et
al., 2020a; Link et al., 2021) or the broader economy (Coibion et al., 2020c). Another set of
studies have applied information provision experiments to examine the causal effect of
macroeconomic expectations on behavior. For instance, these papers have studied how
households’ spending decisions are affected by expectations about GDP growth (Coibion
et al., 2021a; Roth and Wohlfart, 2020), house prices (Qian, 2019), or inflation (Coibion et
al., 2019a), and how inflation expectations influence firms’ decisions (Coibion et al., 2019c).
In a developing country context, Galashin et al. (2020) examine how information about
inflation or the exchange rate affects consumer spending as measured in administrative
credit card data. Roth et al. (2021b) study how households’ perceptions of their exposure
to macroeconomic risk causally affect information acquisition. Finally, information experi-
ments have been used to study the effectiveness of different forms of policy communication
(Coibion et al., 2019b; D’Acunto et al., 2020). In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic,
Coibion et al. (2020b) and Binder (2020) study how provision of information about policy
responses shapes households’ macroeconomic expectations and spending plans.
Household Finance Research in household finance has studied the effects of informa-
tion provision on retirement savings (Beshears et al., 2015; Dolls et al., 2018). Moreover,
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Bursztyn et al. (2019) examine how moral appeals affect debt repayment. Bursztyn et al.
(2014) study the mechanisms underlying peer effects in financial decisions. Bottan and
Perez-Truglia (2020a) study the causal effect of home price expectations on the timing of
home sales using a large-scale field experiment featuring administrative data. Laudenbach
et al. (2021) use an information experiment to study the causal effect of subjective beliefs
about stock returns on investment choices measured in administrative account data. In the
context of the coronavirus pandemic, Hanspal et al. (2020) provide experimental evidence
that beliefs about the duration of the stock market recovery shape households’ expectations
about their own wealth and their planned investment decisions and labor market activity.
Labor and education economics Information provision experiments have been applied
to study job search (Abebe et al., 2020; Altmann et al., 2018; Belot et al., 2018, 2019; Carranza
et al., 2020; Franklin, 2017), social norms (Bursztyn et al., 2020b), educational aspirations
(Lergetporer et al., 2018b), schooling decisions (Jensen, 2010), major choice (Bleemer and
Zafar, 2018; Conlon, 2019; Wiswall and Zafar, 2014), postgraduate enrolment (Berkes et
al., 2019) as well as school choice (Ajayi et al., 2017; Andrabi et al., 2017). Researchers
have shown that information about school quality affects parental investment decisions
(Greaves et al., 2019) and that parents’ beliefs about children’s ability affect their educa-
tional investments (Dizon-Ross, 2019). Coffman et al. (2017) highlight that information
about peers’ choices can affect job choice. Researchers in behavioral labor economics
have also studied how information provision about peers affects people’s work morale
and labor market behavior (Card et al., 2012; Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2018). In agricul-
tural economics, information provision experiments are also widely applied; for example,
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Hanna et al. (2014) study the effects of information on farmers’ behavior. In the context
of migration, Baseler (2021) studies how perceived returns to migration shape migration
decisions in Kenya, while Shrestha (2020) studies how information about the potential
risks of dying and potential wages from working abroad affects actual migration decisions
in Nepal. Humphries et al. (2020) study the role of information frictions for access to the
Paycheck Protection Program in the context of the coronavirus pandemic.
Health economics Information provision experiments have also been widely used to
study information relevant for health behaviors. In the context of the US, Nyhan and
Reifler (2015) and Nyhan et al. (2014) study the effects of information campaigns about
vaccines. Alsan and Eichmeyer (2021) study persuasion regarding the medical benefits of
influenza vaccination with a particular focus on racial identity. Barari et al. (2020) study
public health messaging and social distancing in the context of the coronavirus pandemic,
while Fetzer et al. (2020) and Akesson et al. (2020) study perceptions of the pandemic risk
factors. Faia et al. (2021) use an information experiment to study biases in information
selection and processing in the context of the pandemic.
In developing country settings, Kremer and Miguel (2007) document muted effects of
information on how to avoid worm infections.2 Fitzsimons et al. (2016) find that informa-
tion provision to mothers in Malawi increases children’s food consumption. Carneiro et al.
(2020) study an intervention targeting early life nutrition, which also provides nutritional
information. Banerjee et al. (2015) examine how information affects take-up of Double
Fortified Salt. Bennear et al. (2013) examine how household drinking-water choices were
2For a review of this literature in developing country settings, see Dupas and Miguel (2017).
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affected by two different messages about risk from naturally occurring groundwater ar-
senic. Madajewicz et al. (2007) show that information about well safety regarding arsenic
levels results in large switches from unsafe to safe water sources. Levine and Kinder (2004)
discuss the success of on oral rehydration information campaign for diarrhea treatment.
A substantial amount of research has been conducted on the role of beliefs in sexual
behaviors. Dupas (2011) and Kerwin (2018) examine how information about HIV risks
affects sexual behaviors. Ciancio et al. (2020) study how mortality risk information changes
survival expectations and sexual behaviors in Malawi. Chong et al. (2013) study the
impact of an online sexual health education course provided through schools in Colombia.
Jamison et al. (2013) examine how information about sexual and reproductive health affects
knowledge and sexual behavior in a general population sample in Uganda. Shacham et
al. (2014) study how information about the relationship between circumcision and HIV
status affects sexual behavior in Malawi. Miller et al. (2020) find that simply informing
women about pregnancy risk increases stated intentions to use contraception substantially.
Researchers has also studies how learning about one’s HIV status affects sexual behavior
(Delavande and Kohler, 2012; Gong, 2015).
As Kremer et al. (2019) note, most of studies in the context of developing countries focus
on the effects of information on behavior and not beliefs. We believe that the elicitation of
beliefs would be helpful to more clearly understand why certain information interventions
are more successful in changing behavior than others. This is especially important in the
context of health behaviors, where trust in information may vary substantially depending
on prior belief and the identity of the sender.
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3 Measuring Beliefs
Information provision experiments aim to study the effect of information on people’s
beliefs or to generate exogenous variation in beliefs to study the effect of beliefs on other
outcomes. This section discusses whether one should measure prior beliefs before the in-
formation provision and posterior beliefs after the information provision. It also discusses
issues related to the measurement of beliefs, including advantages and disadvantages of
measuring qualitative or quantitative point beliefs versus probabilistic beliefs, the use of
external benchmarks for the elicitation of beliefs, the framing of belief elicitations, and
techniques on how to deal with measurement error. Finally, we review the measurement
of beliefs using hypothetical vignettes.
3.1 Eliciting prior and posterior beliefs?
There are several advantages to eliciting prior beliefs in information provision experiments.
First, eliciting prior beliefs about the provided piece of information allows researchers
to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects by prior beliefs. This is particularly relevant
in designs with a pure control group (that is, a control group that does not receive any
information). Depending on their priors, groups of participants may update their beliefs in
different directions in response to the information, leading to a muted average treatment
effect. For instance, consider the experiment by Cruces et al. (2013), which gives people
information about their relative position in the income distribution. Since some people
overestimate their position while other people underestimate their position, providing
accurate information will lead overestimators and underestimators to update their beliefs
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in opposite directions. Eliciting prior beliefs is, therefore, necessary to make a directional
prediction about how different groups should update their beliefs and change their behav-
ior in response to the information. Furthermore, even if all respondents update their beliefs
in the same direction, analyzing heterogeneity by prior beliefs allows the researcher to
assess whether treatment effects on the outcome of interest are larger for respondents who
received a larger information shock. Such heterogeneous effects by prior beliefs are often
viewed as evidence that treatment effects are driven by genuine changes in beliefs rather
than priming (see Section 4.5). Second, when the outcome of interest is an expectation,
eliciting prior beliefs related to this outcome allows the researcher to estimate learning
rates from the information (see Section 8). Third, eliciting either type of prior beliefs
increases statistical power for detecting treatment effects (Clifford et al., 2020).
Eliciting posterior beliefs is important in settings where there is a direct interest in
studying the effect of information on these beliefs. Moreover, the measurement of posterior
beliefs is necessary to learn about the size of the first stage in settings where information
provision experiments are used to study the causal effects of beliefs on other outcomes.
In settings where respondents are provided with information about facts (e.g., Roth et
al., 2021a), eliciting posteriors primarily serves to measure trust in or attention to the
information. As such, eliciting posteriors is less strictly needed than in designs where
respondents receive a potentially noisy signal about a variable (e.g., Roth and Wohlfart,
2020), where posteriors are used to assess how informative respondents find the provided
signal.
A potential downside of designs measuring both priors and posteriors about the same
object is that such within-designs potentially lead to stronger experimenter demand effects
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(see Section 6). Alternatively, respondents may be subject to consistency bias in their
survey responses (Falk and Zimmermann, 2012), leading to a muted effect of information
in within-designs. However, Roth and Wohlfart (2020) do not find any significant effect of
eliciting priors on the estimated average learning rate in the context of information about
macroeconomic risk. Similarly, Clifford et al. (2020) find little evidence of bias in estimated
treatment effects due to the elicitation of prior beliefs in survey experiments on political
attitudes. Moreover, in designs with a pure control group, being asked the same question
twice might confuse respondents in the control group. One remedy is to use a different
elicitation mode for the posteriors compared to the priors (Coibion et al., 2019b) or to elicit
post-treatment beliefs about a related but different outcome (Haaland and Roth, 2021).
3.2 Qualitative, quantitative or probabilistic beliefs?
How exactly should one measure beliefs? Should one measure beliefs using qualitative
or quantitative survey questions? Should one measure point estimates on quantities or
probabilistic beliefs in which people attach probabilities to different states of the world
occurring?3
Qualitative beliefs: verbal response scales One way to measure beliefs is to present
respondents with verbal response scales, e.g. reaching from “very low” to “very high,”
or from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” Such belief measures have the simple
advantage that the response options are easy to understand for respondents, but a clear
disadvantage is that they are not easily interpersonally comparable, which can result
3See Delavande et al. (2011) and Delavande (2014) for excellent overviews on the measurement of
subjective beliefs with a particular focus on developing country settings.
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in severe identification challenges (Bond and Lang, 2019). For instance, in the context
of measuring beliefs about the size of the immigration population, people might hold
systematically different views on whether a given fraction of immigrants in the population
is “very low” or “very high.” Such differences in the interpretation of qualitative response
options can be driven by partisanship, as shown by Gaines et al. (2007) for the case of beliefs
about the Iraq war. Moreover, verbal response scales are relatively crude and therefore
limit the extent of information that can be conveyed (Manski, 2018). Furthermore, with
qualitative beliefs, it is often theoretically ambiguous in which direction people should
update their beliefs in response to an information treatment. For instance, to manipulate
perceptions about the size of the immigration population in the United States, one could
inform treated respondents that 12 percent of the US population are immigrants (Grigorieff
et al., 2020; Hopkins et al., 2019). Without a quantitative pre-treatment beliefs measure,
it is not clear whether treated respondents should revise their beliefs about the size of
the immigration population upwards or downwards in response to this information. At
the same time, given their advantages in terms of simplicity, including qualitative belief
measures can at least serve as a robustness check for results based on quantitative belief
data.
Qualitative beliefs: open-ended questions It is also possible to use open-ended ques-
tions to measure beliefs (Andre et al., 2019; Bursztyn et al., 2020e; Stantcheva, 2020). The
key advantage of such open-ended questions is that respondents are not primed by the
available response options. In other words, open-ended questions enable researchers to
directly measure what “comes to mind.” They therefore allow researchers to shed light on
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people’s attention allocation. For example, Andre et al. (2019) study which propagation
mechanisms come to households’ and experts’ minds when thinking about canonical
macroeconomic shocks. In the context of macroeconomic expectation formation, Leiser
and Drori (2005) and D’Acunto et al. (2019) study people’s associations with inflation
using open-ended text questions. Stantcheva (2020) examines what considerations people
have in mind when thinking about a given policy. Bursztyn et al. (2020e) use such an
open-ended elicitation to study inference about the motives for xenophobic expression. Us-
ing a pre-registered text analysis procedure and hand-coding of the qualitative responses,
they use this data for studying inference. They validate their open-ended question with a
structured belief measure and establish strong correlations. In the context of information
provision experiments, open-ended questions have two main purposes. First, they can be
used as a validation check for the quantitative belief data (as in Bursztyn et al. 2020e). Sec-
ond, they can be used to study whether providing information changes people’s attention
to a given topic.
Quantitative point beliefs Quantitative point beliefs, where respondents are asked to
state their beliefs on a numerical scale, have the advantages of interpersonal comparability
while still being relatively straightforward for respondents to understand, but they do not
allow for individuals to express their uncertainty about outcomes. It is therefore a good
practice to add a second qualitative question on how sure or confident people were in their
previous answer. For instance, such qualitative measures of confidence can be used for tests
of Bayesian updating (Armona et al., 2019; Roth and Wohlfart, 2020)4 or to examine whether
4Since confidence in priors is not randomly assigned and is likely correlated with other variables, such
tests are often only suggestive.
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subjective measures of confidence are related to the accuracy of people’s beliefs (Graham,
2018). Furthermore, eliciting confidence allows the researcher to differentiate between
strong misperceptions and a lack of knowledge. A second disadvantage of point beliefs is
that it is unclear which feature of their subjective belief distribution over potential future
outcomes respondents report. While researchers often implicitly or explicitly interpret
point beliefs as the mean over the respondent’s subjective distribution, respondents may
report their median or mode belief.5 Lastly, people’s point beliefs might be sensitive to
question framing (Eriksson and Simpson, 2012).
Probabilistic beliefs In probabilistic belief elicitation, respondents state probabilities for
the occurrence of different mutually exclusive events. Such probabilistic elicitations have
the advantage that there is a well-defined absolute numerical scale that is interpersonally
and intrapersonally comparable (Manski, 2018). Probabilistic elicitations were pioneered by
Manski (2004) and have been widely and successfully applied in some areas in economics,
such as labor economics, and the economics of education (Attanasio et al., 2021; Boneva and
Rauh, 2017; Boneva et al., 2019; Wiswall and Zafar, 2016, 2017) as well as health economics
(Delavande and Kohler, 2009). These measures allow researchers to directly compute
a measure of uncertainty as well as the mode, the median and the mean. Probabilistic
data also enable researchers to characterize the nature of updating beyond showing
average learning rates, or to document biases in updating. For instance, Barron (2021)
uses a probabilistic elicitation to test whether people update their beliefs in the financial
5For instance, De Bruin et al. (2011) show that survey respondents’ point forecasts about future inflation or
future wage growth are not consistently associated with means constructed from individual-level subjective
probability distributions over future inflation or wage growth, but are often associated with the median or
other measures of central tendency of respondents’ reported distribution.
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domain in line with a Bayesian benchmark. Directly measuring people’s uncertainty
has recently received additional attention in the context of abstract choice and updating
tasks as well as survey expectations. Enke and Graeber (2019) propose a measurement of
cognitive uncertainty and show people who are cognitively uncertain implicitly compress
probabilities towards a cognitive default of 50:50 in binary state spaces.
One drawback of probabilistic scales is that a large fraction of the population has
difficulties in understanding and interpreting probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
A second drawback is that people’s stated beliefs are typically influenced by how the
outcomes are categorized (Benjamin et al., 2017). A third drawback is that probabilistic
questions are more time-consuming and taxing for respondents, which makes the ex-
periment longer and potentially induces higher attrition or a higher fraction of missing
responses. Some survey providers might also object to the use of probabilistic questions as
they might confuse respondents. However, best-practice recommendations, such as the
use of visual interfaces, have been shown to mitigate some of these problems, even when
working with low-literacy populations (Delavande, 2014; Delavande et al., 2011).
3.3 Benchmarks
One approach measures beliefs about objects of interest for which there is an objective
external benchmark. For instance, in the context of income inequality, one can elicit beliefs
about the income share going to the top 1 percent income earners rather than a general
question about whether income inequality is “high” or “low.” Measuring subjective
beliefs about quantities with well-defined benchmarks has several advantages. First,
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by eliciting beliefs about a well-defined benchmark the experimenter fixes beliefs about
the environment and imposes additional structure on the responses. This in turn may
lower heterogeneity in how the question is interpreted and thereby reduce measurement
error and make responses across participants more comparable. Second, it allows one to
characterize the extent of biases in beliefs compared to the benchmark. Third, it enables
one to incentivize the belief elicitations in a transparent way. Fourth, the availability of
benchmarks allows for the provision of information treatments that are tightly connected
with the belief elicitation. Recent applications of belief elicitations reliant on benchmarks
are studies on social norm elicitations (Krupka and Weber, 2013), racial discrimination
(Haaland and Roth, 2021), intergenerational mobility (Alesina et al., 2018c), immigration
(Alesina et al., 2018a; Grigorieff et al., 2020; Haaland and Roth, 2020), or infectious disease
spread (Akesson et al., 2020; Fetzer et al., 2020).
3.4 Framing of belief elicitations
In settings in which respondents are relatively experienced they are capable of accurately
assessing economic quantities. For example, respondents are relatively good at assessing
the price of gas (Ansolabehere et al., 2013). However, in settings in which respondents
are relatively unfamiliar, there will be higher levels of measurement error especially
when respondents are unsure about the response scale, for example in the context of
unemployment estimates. However, careful framing of questions can reduce measurement
error. For example, the provision of anchors which convey information about the response
scale can reduce measurement error (Ansolabehere et al., 2013). For instance, Roth et al.
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(2021a) measure beliefs about the debt-to-GDP ratio in the US using different historical or
cross-country anchors, and show that the provision of an anchor reduces the dispersion of
beliefs and rounding.
3.5 Multiple measurement
Many belief elicitations involve asking difficult questions to respondents. The cognitive
strain in turn may induce measurement error. How can researchers mitigate the extent
of measurement error? Gillen et al. (2019) propose an IV approach, which leverages
multiple measurements to deal with classical measurement error. We believe that this is
particularly important in the context of (quantitative) belief measurement. When reducing
classical measurement error is important, researchers ideally should measure their belief
of interest using (i) a qualitative survey question, (ii) a quantitative point estimate, and (iii)
a probabilistic question in which respondents attach probabilities to mutually exclusive
states of the world. These multiple measurements in turn can be leveraged to employ the
IV methods that help to deal with measurement error (Gillen et al., 2019). For instance,
Giglio et al. (2021) apply such an IV approach in the context of survey expectations about
stock returns, using both point beliefs and subjective probability distributions. However,
since multiple measurements might be cognitively taxing for respondents, their benefits
must be weighed against the risk of increasing survey fatigue or higher attrition rates.
Moreover, this approach cannot be used in the case of non-classical measurement error.
Finally, randomly assigned information treatments can also be used to instrument beliefs,
and thereby deal with measurement error to some extent (for a discussion of such an IV
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approach, see Section 8).
3.6 Incentives
When eliciting beliefs with an objective external benchmark, it is possible to provide
accuracy incentives to encourage higher effort and more truthful responses. For instance,
with a discrete outcome, one can promise the respondents a monetary reward if they
answer the question correctly. Similarly, with a continuous outcome, one can offer the
respondents a monetary reward if their answer is within some percentage range of the
correct answer. The advantages of these mechanisms are that they are simple to explain to
respondents and provide stark incentives to provide correct answers. The disadvantage
of these mechanisms is that they are only incentive-compatible for eliciting the mode
of a respondent’s belief distribution. While respondents in some situations might be
perfectly willing to provide truthful responses even in the absence of monetary incentives,
incentives might be especially important in political settings where respondents might
form motivated beliefs or receive expressive utility from stating beliefs that are consistent
with their partisan leanings (e.g., Democrats stating a low unemployment rate under a
Democratic president). Consistent with survey respondents stating beliefs in a motivated
way, incentives have been shown to reduce partisan bias in people’s stated beliefs about
economics and politics (Bullock et al., 2015; Prior et al., 2015). For example, the partisan
gap in beliefs about the current unemployment rate shrinks when respondents receive
prediction incentives.6 Relatedly, Settele (2020) shows that gender differences in reported
6This evidence suggests that prediction incentives can lower motivated errors, thereby reducing non-
classical measurement error.
19
beliefs about the gender wage gap shrink in the presence of incentives. Peterson and
Iyengar (2020) find a moderate reduction in partisan differences in beliefs on topics such
as climate change, immigration, or firearms when survey respondents are provided with
incentives and Berinsky (2018) finds small effects of incentives on respondents’ tendency to
endorse political rumors. Allcott et al. (2020), on the other hand, find no effect of incentives
on partisan differences in beliefs about the coronavirus pandemic. Trautmann and van de
Kuilen (2014) find that incentives do not improve the accuracy of people’s predictions
about the behavior of others in lab games. In the context of macroeconomic forecasting, it
has been shown that non-incentivized survey reports strongly correlate with incentivized
belief measures (Armantier et al., 2015) and that incentives do not have any statistically
significant effects on reported beliefs (Roth and Wohlfart, 2020). Similarly, Andre et al.
(2019) find muted effects of incentives on the accuracy of macroeconomic beliefs, even
though response time significantly increases. Moreover, Hoffman and Burks (2020) find
no effect of incentives on workers’ tendency to over-estimate their productivity. Finally,
Grewenig et al. (2021) provide mixed evidence on the relevance of incentives in shaping
accuracy. Their evidence highlights that incentives have similar effects as a prompt to
google the statistic of interest.7 This highlights the potential undesirable side-effects of
incentives when the information of interest is publicly available.
7This issue might be mitigated by using software that prevents people from going outside of their current
browser. Alternatively, one may ask respondents not to use outside information, but it is also conceivable
that such messages might themselves have backfiring effects. In cases where it is very important to have
tight control over the information environment, information provisions experiments can also be conducted
in the laboratory (see e.g., Bursztyn et al. 2020b for an example of an information provision experiment
performed in a laboratory setting).
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Eliciting probabilistic beliefs with incentives If the goal is to elicit probabilistic beliefs
in an incentive-compatible way, one needs to use a proper scoring rule. A commonly used
method is the quadratic scoring rule (QSR) which provides incentive-compatibility for risk-
neutral agents (Brier, 1950). Palfrey and Wang (2009) and Wang (2011) provide evidence
that the QSR induces more accurate and better calibrated forecasts than improper scoring
rules or non-incentivized belief elicitations, respectively. More recently, the binarized
scoring rule (BSR) by Hossain and Okui (2013) has become a popular alternative to the
QSR. Compared to the QSR, in which the size of the reward depends on the accuracy of
people’s estimates, the BSR offers a fixed reward in which the chance of winning the reward
increases in the accuracy of people’s estimates. This makes the BSR incentive-compatible
irrespective of risk preferences. A clear disadvantage of both mechanisms is that they suffer
from flat incentive structures in which relatively large deviations from truthful reporting
generate only modest changes in the expected rewards. Furthermore, Danz et al. (2020)
provide evidence that the complex incentive schemes could lead to less truthful reporting
by making respondents misunderstand the incentive scheme. Specifically, they find a
strong increase in truthful reporting in a treatment without any information about how
incentives are determined compared to a baseline condition providing full information
about how incentives are determined by a BSR. Based on this, we consider it best-practice
to simply inform respondents that it is in their best interests to provide truthful responses
when using a proper scoring rule and only provide the mathematical details to respondents
who express an explicit interest, e.g. in the form of a clickable pop-up box.
Taken together, while incentives seem to be important when eliciting beliefs in the polit-
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ical domain, incentives seem to have little effect on stated beliefs in non-political domains.8
Furthermore, incentives could backfire when the true answer can easily be googled or
when the complexity of the incentive structure makes respondents misunderstand the
payoff structure.
3.7 Hypothetical vignettes
Another approach to measuring beliefs is to ask respondents to make predictions about an
outcome under different hypothetical scenarios. The use of such hypothetical vignettes
is an increasingly popular approach to measure beliefs in contexts that are difficult to
study in a real-world setting, such as education and human capital (Attanasio et al., 2021;
Boneva and Rauh, 2017, 2018; Delavande and Zafar, 2019; Kiessling, 2021; Wiswall and
Zafar, 2017), preferences over wealth taxation (Fisman et al., 2017), and beliefs about the
effects of macroeconomic shocks (Andre et al., 2019). Hypothetical vignettes, in the form of
conjoint experiments where many different attributes are simultaneously randomized, are
widely used to study preferences over different types of immigration (Bansak et al., 2016;
Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Hainmueller et al. (2015)
show that the responses in the vignettes are highly predictive of real-world behaviors.
Hypothetical vignettes have the advantage of allowing the researcher more control over
the context specified to respondents. Potential disadvantages of hypothetical vignettes
include that the hypothetical nature may lower respondents’ effort or induce experimenter
8However, most of this evidence is based on relatively small stakes and it is an open question whether
high-stake incentives would change stated beliefs more strongly. Furthermore, there is some evidence
suggesting that incentives improve the accuracy of forecasts in the context of economic games (Wang, 2011)
and incentives have also been shown to increase performance in memory and recall tasks (Camerer and
Hogarth, 1999).
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demand effects. Furthermore, when designing hypothetical vignettes, it is important to
consider whether experimentally manipulating an attribute also changes beliefs about
other background characteristics (Dafoe et al., 2018). For instance, manipulating whether
an immigrant is described as “motivated to find work” or “not motivated to find work”
might not isolate economic concerns about immigration if the manipulation also changes
beliefs about how likely they are to fit in culturally. Finally, it may be cognitively challeng-
ing for respondents to think in hypotheticals, which could in turn increase measurement
error and reduce external validity.
4 Designing the information intervention
In this section, we discuss issues related to the design of the information intervention.
First, we highlight different types of information that have been provided in prior work.
Second, we discuss which sources of information are commonly used. Third, the section
reviews issues related to the presentation of the information. Fourth, we lay out ways in
which researchers can more credibly identify the effects of information rather than the
effects of priming individuals on an issue. Finally, we review commonly used methods
that employ probabilistic information treatments.
4.1 Types of information
Quantitative information Many survey experiments provide respondents with quantita-
tive information, such as statistics based on official census data (Bottan and Perez-Truglia,
2020b; Grigorieff et al., 2020; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Roth et al., 2021b) or expert forecasts
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about the future of the economy (Armantier et al., 2016; Coibion et al., 2019b; Roth and
Wohlfart, 2020). While quantitative information may be hard to understand for a large
fraction of the population, it often facilitates the interpretation of experimental findings
in the context of a theoretical framework. Moreover, together with elicited priors and
posteriors numerical information allows for the calculation of learning rates (see section
8). Many times researchers provide statistical information about the behavior of others
(Allcott, 2011; Coffman et al., 2017; Duflo and Saez, 2003). A commonly used strategy
provides a random subset of respondents with information about others’ effort choices
(Cantoni et al., 2019; Hager et al., 2020, 2021) or others’ beliefs, preferences and actions
(Bursztyn et al., 2020b,d; Coibion et al., 2020e).
Anecdotal evidence, stories, and narratives Another highly relevant and important, but
different type of information relies on qualitative anecdotes, stories or narratives.9 This
information is not based on statistics, but instead provides qualitative information which
closely resembles case studies. Experiments systematically studying the role of stories,
anecdotal evidence and narratives are still very scarce, and we believe a fruitful area for
future research. Anecdotal information can also be communicated via pictures and videos,
which may be more effective in conveying information. A literature in development
economics has studied how inspirational videos change people’s beliefs and economic
behavior (Bernard et al., 2014; Riley, 2017).10
9Bénabou et al. (2018) study the role of narratives from a theoretical perspective.
10This is also related to a literature studying how the media affects people’s beliefs and their behavior
(Banerjee et al., 2019; Bursztyn et al., 2020a,c; DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; La Ferrara et al., 2012; Martinez-
Bravo and Stegmann, 2017; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014).
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Tailored versus general information One key difference across information treatments
is whether the treatments are tailored to individuals or whether they concern more general
pieces of information. For example, while Roth and Wohlfart (2020) provide all respon-
dents with information about general economic conditions, Roth et al. (2021b) provide
individuals with economic information based on their personal characteristics. In the
context of health behaviors, Prina and Royer (2014) study the impact of providing tailored
information to parents about the body weight of their own school-aged children.
4.2 Sources of information
There are many different sources for information that prior research has used to ex-
ogenously vary respondents’ beliefs and expectations. Researchers commonly provide
respondents with official government statistics (for instance, about the unemployment
rate among immigrants (Grigorieff et al., 2020)) and research evidence (for instance, about
the labor market effects of immigration (Haaland and Roth, 2020), racial discrimination
(Haaland and Roth, 2021), intergenerational mobility (Alesina et al., 2018c), or economic
cost of pandemic response measures (Settele and Shupe, 2020)). In the context of forward-
looking expectations, one method to exogenously vary expectations is the provision of
expert forecasts. In the context of macroeconomic forecasts, Roth and Wohlfart (2020)
provide respondents with different forecasts about the likelihood of a recession and Hager
et al. (2019) provide different expert forecasts about the anticipated turnout to different
protests. In experiments that aim to change perceptions of social norms, researchers pro-
vide respondents with information about the views of respondents as measured in other
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surveys (Bursztyn et al., 2020b). Moreover, researchers have also explored the effects of
randomly providing news articles or statements from policymakers on people’s beliefs and
expectations (Coibion et al., 2019b). In general, it is important to consider how credible
respondents find the source of information. Rafkin et al. (2021) randomize exposure to in-
formation that highlights the government’s inconsistency in the context of the coronavirus
epidemic. They show that when inconsistency is salient, participants have a reduced
propensity to revise prior beliefs about death counts and lower self-reported trust in the
government.
Generating a first stage on beliefs Sometimes, the researcher can choose between several
different truthful sources of information that might differ in how closely aligned they are
likely to be with people’s prior beliefs. If the goal of the information provision experiment is
to generate the largest possible first-stage effect on beliefs, one needs to provide information
that is sufficiently different from people’s prior beliefs to generate an effect. However,
if the information provided is too extreme, respondents might find the information less
credible (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006), making it necessary to strike a trade-off between
providing a large information shock while retaining trust in the information provided.
4.3 Presentation of the information
How should researchers present the information in order to maximize the effectiveness of
the information intervention? To minimize concerns about demand effects, the treatment
should ideally be short and neutrally framed. At the same time, to generate a strong
first-stage effect on beliefs, it is important to present the information in a way that maxi-
26
mizes understanding among respondents. One way to increase the understanding of the
treatment message is to supplement the text with a graphical illustration of the informa-
tion. In designs in which researchers elicit prior beliefs, an intuitive way of presenting
the information graphically contrasts prior beliefs with the value from the information
treatment (see, for instance, Roth and Wohlfart, 2020).
4.4 Identity of the sender
A key question in the design of the information intervention concerns the identity of
the sender of the information. The identity of the sender plays a particularly important
role in domains in which trust in the information is essential. For example, Alsan and
Eichmeyer (2021) study persuasion regarding the medical benefits of influenza vaccination
by experimentally varying race concordance between sender and receiver. They find
that race concordance improves ratings of the sender and signal, but only among Black
respondents. Banerjee et al. (2020) study messaging about the coronavirus pandemic using
a prominent Noble laureate as the messenger. Alatas et al. (2020) study why messaging
from celebrities affects the effectiveness of information dissemination on social media.
Korlyakova (2021) varies whether people receive information about ethnic discrimination
from experts or from ordinary people and finds larger belief updating from information
provided by experts. D’Acunto et al. (2021) show that diverse policy committees are more
effective in managing expectations of underrepresented groups.
In the political domain, it is possible that recipients of information will think that the
information source is biased (for example, households who expect the government to
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manipulate official inflation statistics). Cavallo et al. (2016) show that households update
their beliefs taking the perceived bias of the information source into account. In the context
of macroeconomic expectation formation, Coibion et al. (2019b) study how varying the
source of information about monetary policy affects updating of inflation expectations. In
general, it is good practice to include direct questions on how credible and accurate people
found the provided information at the end of the survey.
4.5 Priming versus information
One key challenge in information experiments is to disentangle the effects of priming from
genuine belief updating.11 Common methods to mitigate concerns about priming include
(i) eliciting prior beliefs of respondents in both the treatment and the control group, (ii)
separate the information provision from the main outcomes with follow-up studies, and
(iii) to include an active control group (that is, the control group also receives (differential)
information). The first approach guarantees that both respondents in the treatment and
the control group are primed on the issue of interest. Moreover, eliciting priors allows
researchers to examine whether treatment effects are stronger among respondents whose
priors are less aligned with the information, which is often interpreted as evidence of
genuine changes in beliefs (Armantier et al., 2016; Lergetporer et al., 2018a; Roth et al.,
2021a). The second approach ensures that any short-lived priming effects are no longer
relevant when the main outcomes are elicited. The third approach ensures that respondents
across all conditions receive information on the issue of interest, but the information differs
in terms of its content. In the following, we discuss the use of active control groups in
11For an excellent review on priming in economics, see Cohn and Maréchal (2016).
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more depth.
Active versus passive control Many information provision experiments measure prior
beliefs on an issue and then provide the treatment group with information on that issue,
while a pure control group receives no information at all. An alternative design would
measure prior beliefs and then provide the treatment and control group with different
information (this approach of using an active control group was pioneered by Bottan and
Perez-Truglia (2020b); for other recent examples of papers implementing active control
groups in information provision experiments, see Akesson et al. (2020); Hager et al. (2019);
Link et al. (2021); Roth and Wohlfart (2020); Roth et al. (2021b); Settele (2020)).
Providing the control group with information has several advantages for studying
the causal effect of expectations on behavior. In a design with a pure control group, the
variation hinges on prior beliefs. The identification mostly comes from individuals with
larger misperceptions ex-ante. An active control group design generates variation in the
relevant belief also among individuals with more accurate priors and therefore identifies
average causal effects of beliefs on outcomes for a broader population. Moreover, receiving
an information treatment may have side effects, such as uncertainty reduction, attention,
and emotional responses (especially in designs where respondents have been corrected).
Such side effects should arguably be similar across groups that receive different pieces
of information. Finally, since prior beliefs may be measured with error and correlated
with both observables and unobservables, causal identification and the interpretation of
heterogeneous treatment effects are more difficult in designs with a pure control group.
There are also some advantages to having a pure control group. First, having a pure
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control group makes it easier to interpret correlations between the pre-treatment beliefs
and the outcome of interest as beliefs among control group respondents are not affected
by the treatment. Second, sometimes the policy relevant question of interest is concerned
with the effect of providing a particular piece of information compared to not providing
this information. See a discussion of these issues in Roth and Wohlfart (2020) in the context
of experiments on macroeconomic expectations or in Hager et al. (2019) in the context of
strategic interactions in political movements. Furthermore, sometimes it is not possible to
have an active control group without deceiving respondents, in which case it is better to
have a pure control group or employ a probabilistic design as discussed below.
4.6 Probabilistic information treatments
Researchers have started to use probabilistic information treatments to compare belief
updating to Bayesian benchmarks (Eil and Rao, 2011; Mobius et al., 2015; Thaler, 2021;
Zimmermann, 2020). In probabilistic information treatments, respondents are told that
with a probability p they will learn the truth about a fact, and with probability (1 − p)
they will learn the opposite of the truth. Employing probabilistic information treatments
provides researchers with fully exogenous variation in beliefs in settings where only one
piece of truthful information about a benchmark is available and otherwise one would
have to revert to a design with one treatment group and a control group. It also provides
researchers with a Bayesian benchmark for the belief updating. However, probabilistic
signals introduce more scope for motivated beliefs into the updating process, which could
in turn lower the effectiveness of the information treatment (Eil and Rao, 2011; Mobius et
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al., 2015; Thaler, 2021). Probabilistic information treatments are usually applied to study
motivated reasoning in belief updating, rather than studying causal effects of information
and beliefs on behaviors. A downside of probabilistic information treatments is that they
are more artificial and less natural for respondents.
Finally, Schwardmann and Van der Weele (2019) use probabilistic information treat-
ments to study how self-confidence affects the persuasiveness of the messenger and find
that higher self-confidence causally increases the persuasiveness of the messenger.
5 Measuring belief updating
In order to understand the mechanisms through which an information treatment operates
it is essential to measure a rich set of beliefs that capture the theoretical mechanisms that
may be at play. We first discuss how to circumvent issues related to numerical anchoring.
Second, we argue that measurement of beliefs about the provided information should be
more commonly used to better understand and interpret the effects of information.
Numerical anchoring An additional methodological concern for quantitative outcome
measures elicited after the information provision, such as posterior beliefs about the statis-
tic, is unconscious numerical anchoring. There are several best-practices for alleviating
concerns about numerical anchoring. First, one can provide irrelevant numerical anchors
and test their effects on the posterior belief of interest in order to gauge the importance of
such anchoring (Cavallo et al., 2017; Coibion et al., 2020f; Roth and Wohlfart, 2020). Second,
one should measure at least some quantitative beliefs on a scale that differs from the scale
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on which the information is communicated. Third, one should also employ qualitative
measures of beliefs, which are naturally immune to numerical anchoring.
Follow-up surveys Follow-up surveys, conducted a few weeks after the initial infor-
mation intervention, are an important tool used to mitigate concerns about numerical
anchoring, which is a short-lived phenomenon. Follow-up surveys also alleviate concerns
about consistency bias in survey responses (Falk and Zimmermann, 2012). Follow-up sur-
veys to study whether information provision has persistent effects on beliefs, preferences,
and behaviors are increasingly common and were pioneered by Kuziemko et al. (2015),
Cavallo et al. (2017) and Coppock (2016) in the context of survey experiments. Follow-ups
in the context of information experiments usually take place one to eight weeks after the
initial information provision. An exception is Fehr et al. (2019) whose follow-up takes
place one year after the initial information provision. In choosing the time between main
and follow-up surveys, researchers often face a trade-off between testing for persistence
and maximizing the recontact rate of respondents.
Measuring beliefs about the information Finally, in order to obtain a better understand-
ing of the effects of the information treatment, we think that researchers should measure
trust in and other beliefs about the provided information. For example, Haaland and Roth
(2020) elicit a rich set of beliefs about the research evidence provided to respondents. Nat-
urally, such explicit questions may induce significant experimenter demand effects. One
way to mitigate concerns about such experimenter demand effects is to elicit incentivized
measures of willingness to pay for the information of interest (Fehr et al., 2019; Haaland
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and Roth, 2021; Hjort et al., 2019; Hoffman, 2016).
Cross-learning Another recurring issue in information provision experiments is cross-
learning. Specifically, respondents may not only update beliefs about the object of interest
but at the same time change their beliefs about other variables. For instance, Coibion et al.
(2019a) find that the provision of information about inflation not only changes respondents’
inflation expectations but also their beliefs about GDP growth. On the one hand, such cross-
learning can be seen as a natural by-product of experimental changes in beliefs, as changes
in beliefs due to natural variation are similarly often correlated across variables. On the
other hand, cross-learning can complicate the interpretation of instrumental variables
(IV) estimates exploiting randomized information provision, as such estimates are often
compared to theoretical benchmarks which do not account for cross-learning. In other
words, in the presence of substantial cross-learning it is less straightforward to interpret
the effects of information on behavior through the lens of belief changes.
One way to overcome the issue of cross-learning is to hold fixed beliefs about other
variables by providing identical information about other variables to respondents in both
the control and the treatment groups. However, simultaneous provision of several pieces
of information might arguably reduce attention to the main piece of information and lead
to a weaker first stage. In any case, researchers should include measures for beliefs about
other variables which could be shifted by the treatment in their survey in order to be able
to detect cross-learning and to gauge its extent and implications. For instance, Link et al.
(2021) provide information about future nominal interest rates and include measures of
posterior inflation expectations to quantify updating of expectations about real interest
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rates.
6 Dealing with experimenter demand effects
One concern with information provision experiments are demand effects (de Quidt et
al., 2018; Mummolo and Peterson, 2019; Zizzo, 2010).12 While recent empirical evidence
suggests a limited quantitative importance of experimenter demand effects in online
surveys in some domains (de Quidt et al., 2018; Mummolo and Peterson, 2019), it is still
possible that in other contexts treatment effects are confounded by experimenter demand
effects as people in the different treatment arms may make differential inference about the
experimenter’s expectations.13 In this section, we outline best-practice recommendations
to mitigate concerns about experimenter demand effects.
Obfuscated follow-ups Haaland and Roth (2020, 2021) propose the use of obfuscated
follow-ups to mitigate concerns about experimenter demand effects. Obfuscated follow-up
surveys are follow-up studies with the same respondents as in the initial experiment, which
are presented as an independent study to participants. Since no treatment is administered
in the follow-up study, differential experimenter demand between the treatment and
control group is unlikely to be a concern unless respondents nonetheless realize that the
follow-up is connected to the main study. Haaland and Roth (2020, 2021) take several steps
to hide the connection between their main study and their obfuscated follow-up study.
12In the case of surveys administered by enumerators, Kerwin and Reynoso (2021) show that reported
beliefs are significantly related to interviewer knowledge and suggest corrections from the perspectives of
interviewer recruitment, survey design, and experiment setup.
13It is plausible that the willingness to please the experimenter could vary across different decision-making
domains which might increase the relevance of demand effects.
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First, they collaborated with a market research company where respondents regularly
receive invitations to participate in surveys. The marketing company sent generic invita-
tions that only reveal information about pay and expected completion time. Second, they
employed two different consent forms for the two surveys. Third, to give the impression
that the follow-up is an independent study, they first ask respondents a series of questions
about their demographics. Fourth, to further obfuscate the purpose of the follow-up, they
pose questions about unrelated issues before asking any of the actual questions of interest.
Following the approach proposed by Haaland and Roth (2020, 2021), Settele (2020) uses an
obfuscated follow-up survey in the context of attitudes towards affirmative action.
Anonymity Anonymity has been argued to be a powerful tool against experimenter
demand effects in experimental research (Hoffman et al., 1994). In the context of policy
preference experiments, researchers have recently relied on the use of anonymous online
petitions in order to mitigate concerns about experimenter demand effects (Grigorieff et al.,
2020). A commonly used additional tool are “list methods” which aim to veil the answers
of individual respondents and are increasingly applied throughout the social sciences
(Bursztyn et al., 2020b; Chen and Yang, 2019; Coffman et al., 2016; Lergetporer et al., 2017).
Incentivized outcomes Over the last few years, researchers have started using incen-
tivized outcomes in the context of survey experiments. A commonly used approach is
to elicit incentivized donations to political organizations which capture specific policy
preferences (Bursztyn et al., 2020d; Grigorieff et al., 2020; Haaland and Roth, 2021; Roth et
al., 2021a; Settele, 2020). Presumably, demand effects should be lower in tasks in which
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real money is at stake.
Field outcomes A small number of studies manage to link information provision with
natural outcomes from the field, such as the take-up of job offers (Bursztyn et al., 2020b),
the repayment of credit card debt (Bursztyn et al., 2019), welfare take-up (Finkelstein and
Notowidigdo, 2019), policy choices of politicians (Hjort et al., 2019), campaign donations
(Perez-Truglia and Cruces, 2017), voting behavior (Cruz et al., 2018; Gerber et al., 2020;
Kendall et al., 2015), canvassing activity using an online application (Hager et al., 2020,
2021), home sales (Bottan and Perez-Truglia, 2020a), credit card spending (Galashin et
al., 2020), or stock trading choices of retail investors (Laudenbach et al., 2021). The key
advantage of these studies is that they provide unobtrusive behavioral outcome data
from a natural setting. Experimenter demand effects are of no concern in many of these
natural settings as respondents are often not aware of the fact that they are part of an
experiment. In general, given that decisions in the field involve much higher stakes than
survey responses, it is unlikely that changes in these outcomes reflect demand effects.
Neutral framing How should researchers frame the information treatments? One way
to minimize the relevance of experimenter demand effects is to adopt a neutral framing
of the experimental instructions. The neutral framing of instructions usually makes the
purpose of the experiment less transparent and draws less attention of respondents to
the expectations and wishes of the experimenter. For example, Bursztyn et al. (2020d)
truthfully tell respondents that they will be assigned to decide whether to authorize a
donation to either a pro-immigrant or an anti-immigrant organization. This reduces
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concerns that researchers are perceived as politically biased.
Obfuscated information treatments One way to mitigate experimenter demand effects
is to obfuscate the information treatments. Specifically, researchers can try to obfuscate
the purpose of the study by providing respondents with additional pieces of information
which are irrelevant, or by giving respondents tasks that give the impression that the
purpose of the study is completely unrelated to the actual goal. One possibility is to give
people an unrelated reason for why they receive the information of interest. For instance,
researchers could tell respondents that they need to proofread or summarize pieces of
information. For an example in the context of immigration attitudes, see Facchini et al.
(2016). Furthermore, in experiments in which the researcher elicits incentivized prior
beliefs, the purpose of the information treatment may be naturally concealed by framing
the information treatment as feedback on whether the respondent’s answer qualified for
an extra payment.
Demand treatments de Quidt et al. (2018) propose the use of demand treatments in
order to measure the sensitivity of behavior and self-reports with respect to explicit
signals about the experimenter’s expectations. For example, they tell respondents that
they “expect that participants who are shown these instructions” will act in a particular
way. The idea behind their approach is that one can use explicit signals of experimenters’
wishes in order to bound the natural action. Roth and Wohlfart (2020) and Mummolo
and Peterson (2019) apply demand treatments in the context of survey experiments on
macroeconomic expectations and in political science, respectively, and confirm the finding
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that responsiveness to demand treatments is quite moderate.
Measuring beliefs about the study purpose Many research studies in economics and
psychology measure beliefs about the study purpose. Demand effects are less likely a
concern in an experiment or survey if participants cannot identify the intent of the study.
Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) measure perceptions of study intent and show that that there
is strong dispersion in perceived intent within treatment groups, suggesting that it is
unclear in which way demand effects might affect behavior. To test whether respondents
across treatment arms hold different beliefs about the study purpose, Bursztyn et al. (2020e)
use a machine learning classifier to predict treatment status based on open-ended text
responses about perceived study purpose.
Heterogeneity by self-monitoring scale Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) argue that if de-
mand effects are driving behavior in experiments, then they should be more pronounced
for respondents who are more able to detect the intent of the study and are more willing to
change their choices given the experimenter’s intent. Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) employ
the self-monitoring scale by Snyder (1974) and find no evidence that self-monitoring ability
moderates the treatment effect.
Summary Overall, evidence suggests that demand effects may be of less limited quanti-
tative importance in online experiments in some domains (de Quidt et al., 2018). However,
the importance of demand effects could vary a lot across settings. We believe that they
might be a concern particularly in sensitive domains in which participants care about
pleasing the experimenter, while they are less of a concern in domains in which partici-
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pants care about expressing their true preferences. Since it is ex-ante unclear how relevant
demand effects are, it is best-practice to include some of the above outlined checks.
7 Samples
In this section, we first provide an overview of samples that are commonly used to conduct
information provision experiments, with a particular focus on the United States. We then
then provide recommendations on how to measure attention in online surveys to ensure
high-quality responses.
7.1 Online panels
We now discuss the advantages and disadvantages of three different types of online
samples that are commonly used for conducting information provision experiments: (i)
probability-based samples, (ii) online panels representative in terms of observables, and
(iii) online labor markets, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Probability-based samples The most representative samples are probability-based pan-
els. In a probability-based panel, the survey company recruits the sample by randomly
selecting households from a representative sample frame. People cannot join the panel
unless they have been randomly selected for participation. Random sampling from a
representative sample gives these panels some desirable theoretical properties relating to
unbiasedness and quantifiable margins of error. However, given that the non-response
rate for probability-based panels is often quite high, there is still a strong element of
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self-selection into the panels.14 A clear advantage of probability-based samples is that they
include more respondents who are typically under-represented in non-probability-based
samples, such as low-income and rural respondents as well as respondents from the non-
Internet population. The disadvantages of probability-based samples are that they are
typically much costlier than convenience samples and that they typically offer the least
degree of flexibility in survey design and implementation.
In the United States, a widely used probability-based panel is AmeriSpeak by NORC at
the University of Chicago. The panel uses NORC’s National Frame, which is designed to
provide at least 97 percent sample coverage of the US population. The NORC National
Frame is used for several landmark studies in the US, including the General Social Survey,
which is one of the most frequently analyzed data sets in the social sciences. Other
probability-based samples of the US population open to academic researchers include
the RAND American Life Panel, the Understanding America Study at the University of
Southern California, and the Ipsos KnowledgePanel (formerly administered by GfK).
Representative online panels Representative online panels are constructed to be rep-
resentative of the general population in terms of observable characteristics, but do not
use random sampling to recruit respondents. In a representative online panel, the survey
company recruits respondents through, for instance, advertisements, and anyone who
wants to join the panel is free to do so. The main advantage of these panels is that they
are much more affordable than probability-based panels while retaining representatives
14In the United States, a typical response rate for probability-based samples is between 5 and 15 percent; see
https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/u-s-survey-research/our-survey-methodology-in-detail/
(accessed April 9, 2021)
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in terms of some important observable characteristics, such as age, income, race, and
gender. The main drawbacks of these panels are that the lack of random sampling makes
it difficult to estimate the margin of error for the general population and that they do
not include respondents from the non-Internet population. However, given that most
probability-based panels have relatively high non-response rates, the differences in the
extent of selection between probability-based samples and representative online panels
might not be that large in practice.
Three large providers that are widely used in the social sciences are Dynata (formerly
Research Now and Survey Sampling International), Lucid, and YouGov. While some
providers (such as YouGov) aim to match higher-dimensional cells of the population
(such as age X gender), others (such as Lucid) approximate marginal distributions of
basic demographics in the population. Furthermore, they allow for the use of obfuscated
follow-up studies. The main disadvantage of these panels is that inferences may be less
externally valid and there is a concern that respondents who self-select into online panels
are very different from the broader population. However, using German data, Grewenig et
al. (2018) show that the online and the offline population hardly differ in terms of survey
responses in the context of political views and opinions, once the survey method and
observable respondent characteristics are controlled for.
Coppock and McClellan (2019) find that samples from Lucid score similarly to respon-
dents in the American National Election Study (ANES) on the Big-5 personality inventory,
show similar levels of political knowledge, and recover framing effects similar to the
ones observed in a probability-based sample (the General Social Survey). Haaland and
Roth (2021) find similar experimental results using a sample from a representative online
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panel provider and a probability-based sample. Other comparable providers are Respondi,
Prolific, and the Qualtrics panel.
Amazon Mechanical Turk The third type of available online sample are online labor
markets, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), which are widely used in the social
sciences and economics (Kuziemko et al., 2015). Coppock (2018) conducts 15 replication
experiments and finds a very high degree of replicability of survey experiments in the field
of political science with MTurk as compared to nationally representative samples. Horton
et al. (2011) replicate several well-known lab experiments using MTurk, concluding that
online experiments on MTurk are just as valid as traditional physical lab experiments.
However, recent studies suggest that data quality on MTurk has been declining over
time, partly through the proliferation of bots (automated computer programs) and non-
serious respondents, which threatens the data quality on the platform if sensible screening
procedures are not implemented (Ahler et al., 2019; Chmielewski and Kucker, 2020). To
maximize data quality on MTurk, one should only allow workers that have completed a
large number of previous tasks with a high completion rate. Furthermore, in the actual
survey, one should include fraud detection tools to rule out bots, such as a CAPTCHA, at
the beginning of the survey. While MTurk is less representative than most other survey
platforms, the platform has some important advantages. First, data collection speed is
typically very fast and it offers researchers maximum flexibility in terms of research design.
Second, since users sign up for MTurk with their own credit card, it is also possible to
incentivize respondents with real money (respondents from more representative panel
platforms are typically paid in panel currencies that can be converted into gift vouchers).
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Third, it is possible to conduct follow-up studies with low attrition rates (Grigorieff et al.,
2020).
7.2 Measuring attention in online surveys
Screeners One concern in online surveys is that respondents are inattentive and speed
through the surveys (Krosnick, 1991). We recommend using multiple attention checks
in online surveys. Recent research suggests that the inclusion of attention checks does
not affect estimated treatment effects, but it allows researchers to study how measured
attention affects behavior (Berinsky et al., 2014; Kane and Barabas, 2019). One example of
an attention screener is the following:
The next question is about the following problem. In questionnaires like ours,
sometimes there are participants who do not carefully read the questions and
just quickly click through the survey. This means that there are a lot of random
answers which compromise the results of research studies. To show that you
read our questions carefully, please enter turquoise as your answer to the next
question. What is your favorite color?
There are at least two features of attention checks that we consider important: first, it is
important for attention checks to explain to participants why researchers use these attention
checks. This explanation can mitigate concerns about negative emotional reactions to the
use of attention checks on the part of participants. Second, we think that attention checks
should be simple to understand and should not be too cognitively demanding. Therefore,
having an unambiguous and easy-to-understand question is important. For an excellent
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review on attention checks, see Berinsky et al. (2014).
Open-ended questions Bots have been identified as a threat to online surveys. On top
of standard bot protections, such as asking respondents to categorize distorted pictures
that computers cannot easily recognize (CAPTCHAs), we recommend using at least two
open-ended questions in the survey, e.g. to inquire about feedback on the survey or to
ask about the study purpose. These open-ended questions are a useful tool to assess data
quality and to identify bots that may provide identical (and/or non-sensical) responses to
different open-ended questions.
8 Typical effect sizes and recommended sample sizes
In this section, we briefly discuss typical effect sizes from information provision experi-
ments.
Learning rates Information experiments usually measure belief updating using either
qualitative or quantitative questions. In the context of quantitative beliefs, papers often
include a calculation of learning rates. To calculate such learning rates, we require prior
beliefs about the provided piece of information.15 Moreover, typically we observe both a
treatment group which receives information and a control group, which does not receive
any information. To quantify the extent to which the respondents update their beliefs
towards the signal they receive during the information treatment, one can estimate the
15An exception are designs with an active control group, in which the average learning rate can be inferred




Updatingi = β0 + β1TreatmentiPerc.-gapi + β2Treatmenti + β3Perc.-gapi + εi
where Updatingi is defined as the difference between the respondent’s posterior and
prior about the quantity of interest. Since priors about the quantity of interest should
be balanced across treatment arms, one could alternatively directly use the posterior as
left-hand-side variable. The perception gap, Perc.-gapi, is the difference between the true
signal and the respondent’s prior belief about the signal. The key coefficient of interest,
β1, captures the extent of belief updating toward the provided signal among respondents
in the treatment group, on top of any updating that also happens for respondents in the
control group. β2 captures the average treatment effect on respondents’ beliefs to the
extent it does not depend on individual priors. β3 measures the extent to which changes
in beliefs in the control group depend on the perception gap. It is essential to control for
Perc.-gapi in a non-interacted form, as also respondents who were not provided with the
information may change beliefs into the direction of the signal, e.g. because they have
thought more carefully about the question once they are asked a second time, or because
they have committed a typo the first time they stated their beliefs (Fuster et al., 2020).
Cavallo et al. (2017) and Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2018) show how the coefficient β1
can be given a more structural interpretation. Specifically, under Bayesian updating with
normally distributed priors and signals (where the moments of these distributions are
independent of each other), and quadratic loss function, updating of beliefs will be linear
in the perception gap. β1 captures the weight respondents put on the signal, while putting
45
a weight of 1 − β1 on their prior belief.
Table 1 gives an overview of estimated learning rates from a few select information
experiments that provide quantitative information and calculate such learning rates. Many
of the papers estimating quantitative learning rates focus on macroeconomic expectations.
For instance, Armantier et al. (2016) find a learning rate of 0.39 for 1-year inflation expecta-
tions in response to a professional forecast. Armona et al. (2019) estimate an instantaneous
learning rate of 0.18 for house price growth in response to information about past house
price growth. In a two-month follow-up, they estimate a learning rate of 0.13, indicating a
high degree of persistence. Cavallo et al. (2016) estimate learning rates between 0.3 and
0.8 for inflation expectations in response to information about official inflation statistics or
product price changes, which persist at about half of their initial values in a two-month
follow-up. Roth and Wohlfart (2020) estimate a learning rate of 0.32 for recession expecta-
tions in response to a professional forecast. In a two-week follow-up, they document a
learning rate of 0.13, indicating a moderate degree of persistence. Taken together, these
papers document that people persistently learn from the information provided, but that
effects in most cases become weaker over time.
Effect sizes on beliefs versus behavior Effect sizes on self-reported attitudes and be-
havioral measures are typically much smaller in magnitude than effect sizes on belief
updating in response to information treatments. For instance, Alesina et al. (2018c) employ
an information treatment to generate exogenous variation in perceptions of social mobility.
While perceptions about the probability of remaining in the bottom quintile of the income
distribution increase by 9.7 percentage points—thus making treated respondents substan-
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tially more pessimistic about the social mobility process—the authors find essentially
no average impact on policy preferences. Similarly, an experiment by Kuziemko et al.
(2015) provides respondents with accurate information about the income distribution.
They find a large effect on beliefs about income inequality: treated respondents are 12
percentage points more likely to believe that income inequality has increased. By contrast,
policy preferences are largely unaffected by the treatment. Haaland and Roth (2020) report
results from an experiment where effect sizes on beliefs and preferences are quite similar
in magnitude. Specifically, they provide respondents with research evidence showing no
adverse labor market impacts of low-skilled immigration. Treated respondents become
17.1 percent of a standard deviation more optimistic about the labor market impacts of low-
skilled immigrants and 14.1 percent of a standard deviation more in favor of low-skilled
immigration.16
Instrumental variable estimation and behavioral elasticities One way to illustrate ef-
fect sizes is to estimate two-stage least squares specifications, where the endogenous belief
of interest is instrumented with the randomized information provision. For example,
Bottan and Perez-Truglia (2020a) find that a 1 percentage point increase in home price
expectations reduces the probability of selling within 6 months by 2.5 percentage points.
Roth and Wohlfart (2020) find that a 10 percentage point increase in the perceived like-
lihood of a recession leads to a decrease in planned consumption growth by 13 percent
of a standard deviation. A simple measure of the effect of beliefs on behavior that is
16In some cases information interventions not only fail to correct, but even increase misperceptions among
the targeted ideological group (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). However, while the evidence on the effectiveness
of correction of misperceptions in the political domain is mixed, such “backfiring” effects seem to be the
exception (Guess et al., 2020; Nyhan, 2020, 2021).
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comparable across settings are “behavioral elasticities.” Such elasticities can be calculated
by regressing the log of the outcome of interest on the log of posterior beliefs instrumented
by the treatment assignment. For example, Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2018) find that
increasing the perceived manager salary by 10% would increase the number of hours
worked by 1.5%. The key advantage of these approaches is that they make it easier to
compare results across settings. The key disadvantage is that the exclusion restriction
needed for an IV estimation may not hold as the information provided may change several
beliefs simultaneously (see our discussion on cross-learning).
Sample sizes While information provision experiments often produce relatively large
effect sizes on beliefs, effect sizes on stated preferences or behavioral outcomes are typically
much lower. Indeed, it is not uncommon to observe null effects on the main outcomes of
interest despite a large and significant first stage on beliefs (e.g., Alesina et al. 2018c; Haa-
land and Roth 2021; Kuziemko et al. 2015). Furthermore, how elastic different outcomes
are with respect to changes in beliefs naturally varies a lot across different settings, making
it difficult to make a generic recommendation about optimal sample sizes. For instance,
an information provision experiment studying actual voting turnout—a sticky outcome
where it is unrealistic to expect large effects of an information treatment—requires a larger
sample size than a similar information provision experiment studying self-reported voting
intentions.
While the optimal sample size depends on the context, null findings are not uncommon
in information provision experiments and it is important to have sufficient statistical
power to be able to measure a null finding relatively precisely. As a minimum, we think
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information provision experiments should have at least 80 percent power to detect a
treatment effect of 15 percent of a standard deviation. This requires a sample size of at
least 700 respondents per treatment arm of interest. For studies including a follow-up
study, one should take into account the likely attrition between the main study and the
follow-up and adjust the power calculation accordingly. For instance, if one expects a 30
percent attrition between the main study and a follow-up, one needs an initial sample size
of 1,000 respondents per treatment arm to have 80 percent power to detect a treatment
effect of 15 percent of a standard deviation in the follow-up.
9 Concluding remarks
Information provision experiments are a powerful method to test economic theories and
answer policy-relevant questions. As shown in Figure 1, the use of information provision
experiments has grown considerably in economics over the last decade. Furthermore, as
our survey of the literature illustrates, they have become popular in most sub-fields of
economics. Given the importance of generating exogenous variation in beliefs to test many
influential economic theories, and given the potential of information provision experiments
to address questions of high policy relevance, we believe that such experiments will
continue to grow in popularity. We hope that the methodological considerations and
best-practice recommendations discussed in this review will contribute to this growth
by lowering the barriers to conduct information provision experiments for researchers
previously unfamiliar with the methodology.
Common applications of information provision experiments include studying belief
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formation and how exogenous changes in beliefs affect economic behavior. The literature
has demonstrated that the elasticity of beliefs and preferences with respect to information
varies a lot between different domains and settings. Going forward, it will be important
to provide systematic evidence on what determines the effectiveness of information in
changing beliefs. Similarly, it will be important to better understand why exogenous
changes in beliefs lead to large changes in behavior in some domains but not in others.
For instance, factors that are likely to be important for belief updating include the
strength of prior beliefs, the complexity of the information, and people’s experience in
processing information. There could also be a key role for attention and memory in shaping
the associations that come to mind when being presented with information, which may
affect learning from the information.17 The relative importance of these different factors is
currently not well understood, and they are likely of key importance for understanding
differential effects of information across contexts. Furthermore, to systematically assess
the relative importance of different beliefs in shaping economic behavior, we believe
that information experiments that are designed to allow for a structural interpretation
of estimated elasticities between beliefs and behaviors will be especially valuable going
forward.
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Notes: This figure shows the number of information provision experiments published in leading journals
since 2010. For 2021, publications and forthcoming papers as of mid-April are included. The figure is based
on publications in the following journals: American Economic Review, American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
Econometrica, Economic Journal, Journal of Development Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Journal
of Public Economics, Journal of the European Economic Association, Review of Economics and Statistics,
and the Review of Economic Studies. To identify articles, we used Google Scholar to search for all articles
published in these journals since 2010 containing the words information, treatment, beliefs or expectations,
and experiment, and then verified which of the search results featured an information provision experiment.
We also supplemented with papers covered in our review that were not captured using this search algorithm.
This figure does not include information provision experiments operating in a laboratory setting in which
respondents receive information about features of the laboratory environment or the behavior of other
participants in the lab. The figure also does not include information provision experiments in which
respondents are informed about product characteristics.
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Table 1: Estimated learning rates from quantitative information
Authors (year), Context Type of information Immediate LR Time lapse Follow-up LR Persistence
journal, exhibit
Armantier et al. (2016), Inflation Average professional 0.39 No NA NA
REStat, Table 2 expectations forecast (SPF) follow-up
Armona et al. (2019), House price 1-year and 5-year past 0.18 (returns) 2 months 0.13 72%
REStud, Table 9 expectations house price growth 0 (5-year)
Bleemer and Zafar (2018), Perceived returns / Population-level 0.18 (returns) 2 months No learning NA
JPubEc, Table 7 cost college edu- returns/cost 0.35 (cost) rate for
cation own child follow-up
Bottan and Perceived Tailored based on Earnings rank: 5 weeks Earnings rank:
Perez-Truglia (2020), city-level earnings potential own income 0.87 0.63 76%
REStat, Figure 2 rank and costs and statistics Cost of living: Cost of living:
of living from ACS or CPS 0.88 0.75 85%
Cavallo et al. (2017), Inflation Statistics such as the Statistics: 0.84 2 months/ Statistics: 0.36 43%
AEJ: Macro, Table 1 expectations current inflation rate /0.43 (US/Arg.) 4 months /NA (US/Arg.)
or price changes Prices: 0.69 (US/ Prices: 0.34/ 49%
of selected products /0.46 (US/Arg.) Argentina) 0.21 (US/Arg.) 46%
Coibion et al. (2020e), Firms’ first Avg. first- and 1st-ord. exp.: 0.31/ 3 months 1st-ord. exp.: 0.39/ 126%
QJE, Table 3 and higher- higher-order exp. 0.88 (others’ 1st-/ 0.82 (others’ 1st-/ 93%
order inflation of other firms higher-ord. exp.) higher-ord. exp.)
expectations higher-ord. exp.: 0.38/ higher-ord. exp.: 0.28/ 74%
0.84 (others’ 1st-/ 0.79 (others’ 1st-/ 94%
higher-ord. exp.) higher-ord. exp.)
Coibion and Firms’ expectations Infl.: Prof. forecast or Infl: 0.66 6 months 0 0%
Gorodnichenko (2015, about inflation central bank target; (pooled)
AER, Tables 6 and 7 unemployment and Unempl. and GDP: Unempl.: 0.35
GDP growth Past 12 months GDP: 0.44
Fuster et al. (2020), House price Choice btw. expert 0.38 (based 4 months 0.17 45%
REStat, Figures 3 and A.2 expectations forecast, past 1 year on preferred
and past 10 year source of
house price growth information)
Roth et al. (2021a), Beliefs about the Factual information 0.62 4 weeks 0.21 34%
JEconometrics, Table A.18 debt-to-GDP ratio
Roth et al. (2021b), Perceived un- Change in unempl. 0.49 No NA NA
AER: Insights, Table 2 employment risk rate in own follow-up
next recession demographic group
Roth and Wohlfart (2020), Recession Individual professional 0.32 2 weeks 0.13 41%
REStat, Table 1 expectations forecasts (SPF)
Wiswall and Zafar (2014), Own earnings Population-level 0.08 2 years No learning NA
REStud, Table 4 prospects by earnings by rate for
college major college major follow-up
Wiswall and Zafar (2015), Own earnings Population-level 0.34 No NA NA
JHumanCapital, Table 7 prospects by earnings by follow-up
college major college major
Notes: This table provides an overview of estimated learning rates in published papers that study how
individuals update their beliefs in response to the provision of quantitative information and that calculate
learning rates. The table shows both the immediate learning rate measured in the main survey, and the
medium-run learning rate as measured with posterior beliefs elicited in a follow-up survey. For Coibion et
al. (2020e), the learning rate is calculated as one minus the weight put on the prior, scaled by the weight put
on the prior in the control group. For Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015), the learning rate is calculated as
one minus the weight put on the prior.
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